Can the Majority Lose the Election?
16 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2007
Date Written: May 22, 2007
Abstract
One may believe that plurality voting guarantees that the preferences of a majority of the population are implemented. I show that by selecting platforms consisting of stances on binary issues the implemented stances may be misaligned with the population. In a model where parties decide to enter, a party preferred by only a minority can win. In these equilibria a third party pulls votes from the one representing the majority of the population. The result is shown to hold regardless of the number of issues, whether individuals vote sincerely or strategically, and allowing for coalitions.
Keywords: Downsian competition, endogenous candidates, minority winning, platform selection, plurality voting
JEL Classification: D72, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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