The Diffusion of Ideas Over Contested Terrain: The (Non) Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation Among German Firms

Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 501-534, 2004

Posted: 30 Jul 2007

See all articles by Peer C. Fiss

Peer C. Fiss

University of Southern California - Management and Organization Department

Edward J. Zajac

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Business

Abstract

This study offers a sociopolitical perspective on the international spread of corporate governance models. We unpack the heterogeneity of interests and preferences across and within types of shareholders and senior managers over time in an analysis of the adoption of a shareholder value orientation among contemporary German firms. Using extensive data on more than 100 of the largest publicly traded German companies from 1990 to 2000, we find that the influence of major shareholder groups (e.g., banks, industrial corporations, governments, and families) and senior manager types (differing educational backgrounds and ages) can be clearly observed only after redefining these key actors according to common interests and preferences. We also find evidence that German firms engage in decoupling by espousing but not implementing a shareholder value orientation but show that the presence of more powerful and more committed key actors reduces the likelihood of decoupling. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on symbolic management, the diffusion of corporate practices, and the debate over the convergence of national governance systems.

Keywords: Studies, Corporate governance, Shareholder relations, Public companies, Mathematical models

Suggested Citation

Fiss, Peer C. and Zajac, Edward J., The Diffusion of Ideas Over Contested Terrain: The (Non) Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation Among German Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 501-534, 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1003287

Peer C. Fiss (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Management and Organization Department ( email )

Bridge Hall 306
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States
213 821 1471 (Phone)
213 740 3582 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~fiss/

Edward J. Zajac

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Business ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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