Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries

American Political Science Review

42 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2007 Last revised: 14 Nov 2023

See all articles by Irina Denisova

Irina Denisova

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR); New Economic School (NES)

Markus Eller

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB)

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 6, 2008

Abstract

A 2006 survey of 28,000 individuals in 28 post-communist countries reveals overwhelming support for revising privatization, but also that most respondents prefer to leave firms in private hands. We test three theories of support for reform by examining who wants to revise privatization and why. First, consistent with a "utilitarian" view, respondents with poor human capital and few assets support revising privatization in all institutional settings and hold this view because of a material preference for state over private property. Second, contrary to Przeworski's "political inclusiveness" view, economic hardships during transition increase support for state property in democracies to a larger extent than in autocracies and increase support for revising privatization due to a concern for the legitimacy of reforms in all institutional settings. Third, consistent with a "property rights" view, new small-scale entrepreneurs oppose revising privatization and support private property only in good institutional environments as they fear expropriation when institutions are weak.

Keywords: privatization, revision, nationalization, property rights, demand for property rights, legitimacy of property rights, transition

JEL Classification: P20, P26, P46, P50, L33

Suggested Citation

Denisova, Irina and Eller, Markus and Frye, Timothy and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries (March 6, 2008). American Political Science Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1008212 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1008212

Irina Denisova

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow
Russia
+7 095 332 4083 (Phone)

New Economic School (NES)

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Markus Eller

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) ( email )

Otto-Wagner-Platz 3
Vienna, A-1090
Austria
+43 1 404 20-5227 (Phone)
+43 1 404 20-045227 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/Research/Researchers/Markus-Eller.html

Timothy Frye

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

MC3320
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-3646 (Phone)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

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