Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage

Posted: 6 Sep 2007

See all articles by Kong-Pin Chen

Kong-Pin Chen

Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica; National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

Emerson Niou

Duke University - Department of Political Science

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Abstract

In the paper we construct a spatial model that specifies voter utility in terms of responsiveness to public policy and provide an explanation of the seeming paradox that voters who vote for the incumbent also unilaterally self-impose term limits. Our model shows that when the position of the incumbent is closer to the median voter position, it is less likely that voters will support term limits. But if the incumbent's party is more moderate, it is more likely that voters will support term limits. In addition, we argue that term limits or the threat of it will increase the responsiveness of the politicians' policy platforms.

Keywords: term limits, incumbency advantage, spatial model of voting, risk aversion

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Chen, Kong-Pin and Niou, Emerson, Term Limits as a Response to Incumbency Advantage. Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, pp. 390-406, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012523

Kong-Pin Chen (Contact Author)

Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica ( email )

128 Academia Road, Section 2
Nankang
Taipei, 11529
Taiwan

HOME PAGE: http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin

National Taiwan University - Department of Economics

21 Hsiu Chow Rd
Taipei, 10020
Taiwan

Emerson Niou

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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