The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities

Posted: 23 Oct 1996

See all articles by Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: June 1996

Abstract

When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benefits while those who venerate the symbol incur costs. This paper asks whether the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. I conclude they do not. Desecration is often motivated by a desire to reduce the utility of others, which generally is inefficient. Also, if desecration occurs, people have less incentive to create and maintain symbols, which, like other produced goods, need property-rights protection. Laws against desecration are especially useful given the likely failure of the Coase Theorem and the escape valve of efficient law-breaking. It is not even clear whether desecration laws have a net negative effect on the amount of free expression, given the incentive they provide for symbol creation, the possibility of citizens' substitution into other forms of expression, and the possibility of government substitution into other forms of speech suppression.

JEL Classification: D23, K19

Suggested Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities (June 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10175

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