Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions

47 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2007

See all articles by Matthias Sutter

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Martin G. Kocher

University of Vienna

Sabine Strauß

University of Munich

Date Written: October 15, 2007

Abstract

We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even though in reality teams were largely involved in those auctions, experimental studies on bidding in auctions have so far relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction and pay significantly higher prices than individuals. Consequently, teams make smaller profits and suffer more often the winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are more likely to win the auction when teams bid.

Keywords: UMTS auction, team decision-making, experiment, winner's curse

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D44

Suggested Citation

Sutter, Matthias and Kocher, Martin G. and Strauss, Sabine, Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (October 15, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1024421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024421

Matthias Sutter (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Martin G. Kocher

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

Sabine Strauss

University of Munich ( email )

Poschingerstr. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany