Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?

Election Law Journal, Vol. 7, p. 218, 2008

University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 83

18 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2007 Last revised: 28 Oct 2009

Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

Last year, Maryland became the first state to adopt the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote. It was joined early this year by New Jersey. If enough states sign on to this agreement to control the Electoral College, they will all pledge their electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the national popular vote, without regard to which candidate won in each individual state. The compact would effectively supersede the Electoral College and implement popular election of the president without amending the Constitution. Political supporters of the Agreement have been curiously reticent to discuss the validity of the Agreement under Article I, section 10. Although some similar proposals would be invalid under section 10, the Agreement adopted in Maryland does not abuse the structure of the Electoral College, nor does it disrupt the balance of power among the states or between the states and the national government. The Agreement is therefore permissible and probably does not even require congressional consent.

Keywords: Electoral College, national popular vote, interstate compact, bloc voting, unit rule

Suggested Citation

Hendricks, Jennifer S., Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College? (July 1, 2008). Election Law Journal, Vol. 7, p. 218, 2008, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 83, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1030385

Jennifer S. Hendricks (Contact Author)

University of Colorado Law School ( email )

401 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303-735-5453 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=486

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