The Societas Europaea: A Network Economics Approach

Posted: 30 Nov 2007

See all articles by Piero Pasotti

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Stefano Lombardo

Free University of Bozen-Bolzano - CRELE Center for Research in Law and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Free University of Bozen-Bolzano - Faculty of Economics and Management

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Abstract

This article applies network economics to a particular aspect of the statute of the Societas Europaea (SE). The statute allows companies that decide to use the SE form to choose between a two-tier organisational structure (supervisory organ and management organ) and a one-tier organisational structure (administrative organ). By applying the theory of network economics to company law, the article firstly shows that path dependency may arise in the choice of the adopted structure on the basis of the past national regulation. Secondly, the article shows that to overcome this path dependency the incorporation theory would be superior to the real seat theory as provided for by the statute of the SE.

Suggested Citation

Pasotti, Piero and Lombardo, Stefano and Lombardo, Stefano, The Societas Europaea: A Network Economics Approach. European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1036222

Piero Pasotti

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli, 2
Bologna, Bo 40126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/pieropasottiswebpage/

Stefano Lombardo (Contact Author)

Free University of Bozen-Bolzano - CRELE Center for Research in Law and Economics ( email )

Free University of Bolzano
Piazza Universita
Bolzano, BZ 39100
Italy

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

Free University of Bozen-Bolzano - Faculty of Economics and Management

Piazza Universita
Bolzano-Bozen (BZ), 39100
Italy
+39 0471 013491 (Phone)

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