Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits?

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1997.

Posted: 25 Mar 1997

See all articles by Yeon-Koo Che

Yeon-Koo Che

Columbia University

Dietrich Earnhart

University of Kansas - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

We examine the value of incorporating regulatory information into the court liability decision and making it publicly available when the causality of harm is uncertain. Public access to regulatory information, coupled with its use in a liability decision, not only improves the accuracy of court adjudication but also guides victims to more informed decisions about their lawsuits, when victims' private information on causality of harm is verifiable to the court. When victims' information is unverifiable, however, withholding regulatory information until after victims bring lawsuits induces them to utilize their private information better in their litigation decisions.

JEL Classification: K41, K13, D82

Suggested Citation

Che, Yeon-Koo and Earnhart, Dietrich, Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits?. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1997., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10370

Yeon-Koo Che (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

420 W. 118th Street, 1016IAB
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-8276 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271

Dietrich Earnhart

University of Kansas - Department of Economics ( email )

Lawrence, KS 66049
United States
785-864-2866 (Phone)
785-864-5270 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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