Economic Foundations of Competition Laws: The Benefits of Monopoly vs. the Benefits of Competition

132 Pages Posted: 7 May 2008

See all articles by Alfonso Miranda Londoño

Alfonso Miranda Londoño

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Juan David Gutiérrez

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Alberto Lleras Camargo School of Government

Date Written: May 2008

Abstract

Antitrust Law can be described as the set of legal rules that regulate the current or potential power of the companies on a certain market, on behalf of public interest. In practice, the Antitrust Law prohibits the execution of restrictive competition practices, the acquisition of a dominant position in the market through the accomplishment of these practices and the abuse of the dominant position.

This document is an approach to the analysis of one of the fundamental premises of this discipline, which states that the markets in competition produce greater benefits to society than the markets with monopolistic structures. In this order, we will analyze the origins, evolution and purpose of the Antitrust Law, the practical difficulties that the competition authorities must face 'particularly the Latin American authorities', and also the criticisms that have been formulated against the laws that develop Antitrust. For this is purpose the following subjects are exposed: 1) Origins and evolution of the Antitrust Law in the United States of America, the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean. 2) Economic Aspects of the Antitrust Law 3) Competitive markets and monopolistic markets. 4) Criticisms to the Antitrust Law 5) The challenges for the Latin American competition authorities.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: Antitrust Law, monopolies, imperfect markets, restrictive practices and mergers & acquisitions

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Miranda Londoño, Alfonso and Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Juan David, Economic Foundations of Competition Laws: The Benefits of Monopoly vs. the Benefits of Competition (May 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1126903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1126903

Alfonso Miranda Londoño (Contact Author)

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana ( email )

Bogota
Colombia
3122900 (Phone)
3104715 (Fax)

Juan David Gutiérrez Rodríguez

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Alberto Lleras Camargo School of Government ( email )

Cr 1 No 19-27 Classrooms Block AU
Third Floor
Bogotá, 111711
Colombia

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,261
Abstract Views
4,300
Rank
30,373
PlumX Metrics