Sell Side School Ties

45 Pages Posted: 12 May 2008 Last revised: 7 Sep 2022

See all articles by Andrea Frazzini

Andrea Frazzini

AQR Capital Management, LLC

Christopher J. Malloy

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Arrowstreet Capital, LP

Lauren Cohen

Harvard University - Business School (HBS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2008

Abstract

We study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the UK), the analyst school-tie premium has remained large and significant over the entire sample period.

Suggested Citation

Frazzini, Andrea and Malloy, Christopher J. and Cohen, Lauren, Sell Side School Ties (May 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w13973, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1131626

Andrea Frazzini

AQR Capital Management, LLC ( email )

Two Greenwich Plaza, 3rd Floor
Greenwich, CT 06830
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203-742-3894 (Phone)
203-742-3394 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~af227/

Christopher J. Malloy

Harvard Business School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Arrowstreet Capital, LP ( email )

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Lauren Cohen (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Rock Center 321
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/lcohen

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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