R&D Competition in the Shadow of Patent Litigation

Posted: 16 May 2008 Last revised: 9 Apr 2014

See all articles by Yann Ménière

Yann Ménière

Mines ParisTech

Sarah Parlane

University College Dublin (UCD)

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We analyze non-cooperative R&D investment by two firms that already hold patents that they can assert against each other with probabilistic success. The market structure results from stochastic innovation and patent litigation. Depending on the level of infringement fees, we highlight positive and negative effects of litigation threats on innovation. We define an appropriate regulatory structure of infringement fees that will implement socially efficient R&D investments in the case of symmetric and asymmetric patent portfolios.

Keywords: Innovation, Patent, Infringement, Litigation, Efficient investment

JEL Classification: K00, L00

Suggested Citation

Ménière, Yann and Parlane, Sarah, R&D Competition in the Shadow of Patent Litigation (2008). Ménière Y., Parlane, S. (2008) "R&D Competition in the Shadow of Patent Litigation," Review of Industrial Organization, 32(2), 95-111., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133749

Yann Ménière (Contact Author)

Mines ParisTech ( email )

60, bd St Michel
Paris, 75006
France

Sarah Parlane

University College Dublin (UCD) ( email )

Belfield
Belfield, Dublin 4 4
Ireland

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
502
PlumX Metrics