Effective Political Contests

15 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2008

See all articles by Todd R. Kaplan

Todd R. Kaplan

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be ineffective, namely, the chance of low ability candidates participating in the contest might be higher than the chance of high ability candidates participating in the contest (and winning). However, by imposing a costly requirement (fee) on the winner of the contest, one can guarantee that the contest will be effective.

Keywords: All-pay auctions, Contests, Entry costs

JEL Classification: D44, O31, O33

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Todd R. and Sela, Aner, Effective Political Contests (April 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6768, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141673

Todd R. Kaplan (Contact Author)

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+44 13 9226 3237 (Phone)

University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Haifa 31905
Israel

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom