Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Department of Commerce

18 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 1997 Last revised: 10 Jun 2017

See all articles by Peter Swire

Peter Swire

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business; Georgia Tech School of Cybersecurity and Privacy; Cross-Border Data Forum

Date Written: 1997

Abstract

A good deal of recent attention has focused on the potential for "self-regulation" on the Internet and more generally. This article proposes a general framework for deciding among markets, self-regulation and government enforcement in the protection of personal information.

Self-regulation is tempting because of failures in a pure market or pure government approach. The article defines self-regulation, noting that it has the same separation of powers components (legislation, enforcement, adjudication) as traditional law. The case for self-regulation is based on: industry expertise; the creation and enforcement of industry norms of behavior; increase in reputational capital of the industry; improvement of technical standards; and the possibility that the risk of government action will lead to desirable self-regulation. Each of these potential benefits, however, may prove unpersuasive in a particular setting. Self-regulation may also promote cartel behavior or disfavor consumers or other groups not included in the "self." The paper concludes with a set of empirical questions to explore in any given choice among market, self-regulatory, and government approaches.

Suggested Citation

Swire, Peter, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age by the U.S. Department of Commerce. (1997). Department of Commerce, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=11472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.11472

Peter Swire (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
(404) 894-2000 (Phone)

Georgia Tech School of Cybersecurity and Privacy ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30332
United States

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