Venture Capital and the Incorporation Decisions of IPO Firms

48 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2008 Last revised: 28 Jun 2011

Date Written: June 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper investigates whether IPO firms backed by venture capital investors are more likely to incorporate in states that are takeover friendly. Venture capital firms benefit when their portfolio companies are subject to the discipline of the corporate control market. State-level antitakeover statutes diminish the effectiveness of the corporate control market by making firm acquisition more costly. I find that venture capital-backed IPO firms are more likely to incorporate in a takeover-friendly state, such as Delaware. State-level antitakeover statutes are effective takeover deterrents, as my results show that firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states are more likely to be acquired in the five years following their IPO. I also find that firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states have higher Tobin’s Q values than firms incorporated in takeover-unfriendly states, suggesting that state-level antitakeover statutes negatively impact firm value.

Keywords: Governance, Initial public offering, State of incorporation, Venture capital

JEL Classification: G24, G34

Suggested Citation

Boulton, Thomas J., Venture Capital and the Incorporation Decisions of IPO Firms (June 1, 2008). Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 62, No. 6, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1147785

Thomas J. Boulton (Contact Author)

Miami University ( email )

3028 Farmer School of Business
Oxford, OH 45056
United States
(513) 529-1563 (Phone)
(513) 529-8598 (Fax)

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