A Class of Best-Response Potential Games

Working Paper DSE 635, Department of Economics, University of Bologna

9 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2008 Last revised: 24 Jun 2008

See all articles by Davide Dragone

Davide Dragone

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Luca Lambertini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Arsen Palestini

MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome

Date Written: June, 20 2008

Abstract

We identify a class of noncooperative games in continuous strategies which are best-response potential games. We identify the conditions for the existence of a best-response potential function and characterise its construction, describing then the key properties of the equilibrium. The theoretical analysis is accompanied by applications to oligopoly and monetary policy games.

Keywords: best-response potential game, conservative vector field, fictitious profit function

JEL Classification: C72, F42, L13

Suggested Citation

Dragone, Davide and Lambertini, Luca and Palestini, Arsen, A Class of Best-Response Potential Games (June, 20 2008). Working Paper DSE 635, Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1148690 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148690

Davide Dragone

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy
0039.051.2098880 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/davide.dragone/en

Luca Lambertini (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 051 2092600 (Phone)
+39 051 2092664 (Fax)

Arsen Palestini

MEMOTEF - Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano
Roma, Rome 00185
Italy

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
79
Abstract Views
831
Rank
559,428
PlumX Metrics