Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies
Posted: 2 Jul 2008
Date Written: February 1996
Abstract
We construct a formal model, based upon the rules and structure of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, to characterize equilibrium strategies purchased by an agenda-setting Speaker. In conjunction with information about the distribution of preferences in the RCPD, our Czar Rule model yields several testable hypotheses. The model receives some emperical backing, but overall the results of our analyses do not support it. We therefore attribute the conflict between the Yeltsin government and the RCPD to fundamental disagreements over policy and not to internal contradictions in constitutional design.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Myagkovb, Mikhail G., Czar Rule in the Russian Congress of Peoples' Deputies (February 1996). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154581
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