Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other-Regarding Preferences
18 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2008
Date Written: July 2, 2008
Abstract
In standard political economy models, voters are self-interested i.e. care only about own utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have other-regarding preferences (ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit envy and altruism, in addition to the standard concern for own utility. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.
Keywords: Redistribution, other regarding preferences, single crossing property
JEL Classification: D64, D72, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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