The Profitability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions Deterred?

16 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2008

See all articles by Alla Golub

Alla Golub

Purdue University - Department of Agricultural Economics

Joshua Detre

affiliation not provided to SSRN

John M. Connor

American Antitrust Institute (AAI); Purdue University

Date Written: April 8, 2005

Abstract

In this study we investigate whether changes in antitrust penalties issued by the Department of Justice have led to improved effectiveness of antitrust actions with respect to price-fixing over 1981-2001. We use effectiveness of antitrust enforcement documented by Bosch and Eckard (1991) and Thompson and Kaserman (2001) for 1962-80 as a basis for comparison. Results indicate that the changes in antitrust law do improve effectiveness as measured by changes in market valuations of offenders, but the durability of deterrent effect and the rate of recidivism are left unaffected, suggesting that Sherman Act Section 1 enforcement has little lasting effect.

Keywords: Antitrust, recidivism, price fixing, stock market

Suggested Citation

Golub, Alla and Detre, Joshua and Connor, John M. and Connor, John M., The Profitability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions Deterred? (April 8, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1188515 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1188515

Alla Golub

Purdue University - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1145
United States

Joshua Detre

affiliation not provided to SSRN

John M. Connor (Contact Author)

American Antitrust Institute (AAI) ( email )

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Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20036
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HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com

Purdue University ( email )

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