Sequential Decisions with Several Agents
Posted: 16 Sep 1999
Abstract
We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
JEL Classification: D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bassan, Bruno and Scarsini, Marco, Sequential Decisions with Several Agents. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=119972
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