Reputation, Incentives, and Managerial Decision
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE, Ch. 26, pp. 332-337, 1992
Posted: 5 Oct 2008 Last revised: 19 Oct 2008
Abstract
This paper reviews the biases induced by managers' incentives to build his reputation or that of his firm and the resulting distortions in investment and operating decisions. This essay argues that reputation incentives can influence the initiation and termination of projects, the degree of conservatism, the timing of resolution of uncertainty and of cash flows, and conformist versus deviant behavior.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hirshleifer, David A., Reputation, Incentives, and Managerial Decision. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE, Ch. 26, pp. 332-337, 1992, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1278645
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