Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Ostracism
Posted: 1 Dec 2008
Abstract
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners' Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group's members prefer not to diminish its size, ostracism hurts the legitimate members of the group as well as the outcast, putting the credibility of the threat in doubt. Nonetheless, we show that ostracism can be effective in promoting cooperation with either finite or infinite rounds of play. The model can be applied to games other than the Prisoners' Dilemma, and ostracism can enforce inefficient as well as efficient outcomes.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Rasmusen, Eric Bennett and Hirshleifer, David A., Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Ostracism. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 87-106, August 1989, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1279700
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.