Venture Capital Financing and the Informativeness of Earnings

Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 171-190, August 2009

Posted: 8 Oct 2008 Last revised: 10 Oct 2009

See all articles by Daniel A. Cohen

Daniel A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

Nisan Langberg

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2009

Abstract

Are there long-term costs to obtaining venture capital financing? We explore the hypothesis that venture capital backed firms do not efficiently transform to the corporate structure of public firms and have difficulties publicly communicating with arm’s length investors. Our results are three-fold. First, we find that, on average, reported accounting earnings are less informative for venture capital backed firms. Second, the informativeness of reported earnings is a decreasing function of venture capitalists’ ownership of firm equity and a decreasing function of venture capitalists’ board representation. Third, stock prices of venture capital backed firms reflect future earnings to a lesser extent relative to non-venture capital backed firms. Our findings support the hypothesis that venture capitalists manage the flow of public information to capital markets and preserve short-term interests arising from specific investment and ownership horizons. This evidence suggests that the benefits of receiving venture capital financing are not without costs.

Keywords: Venture capital, earnings informativeness, ownership structure, investment horizon

JEL Classification: M41, G14, G32

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Daniel A. and Langberg, Nisan, Venture Capital Financing and the Informativeness of Earnings (July 1, 2009). Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 171-190, August 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1280719

Daniel A. Cohen (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management ( email )

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

Nisan Langberg

Tel Aviv University - Coller School of Management ( email )

Tel Aviv
Israel

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