Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship

Advanced Institute of Management Research Paper No. 007

43 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2008

See all articles by Philippe Aghion

Philippe Aghion

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nicholas Bloom

Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard W. Blundell

UCL; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rachel Griffith

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); University of Manchester; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Peter Howitt

Brown University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 7, 2004

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and innovation. It uses the radical policy reforms in the UK as instruments for changes in product market competition, and finds a robust inverted-U relationship between competition and patenting. It then develops an endogenousm growth model with step-by-step innovation that can deliver this inverted-U pattern.

In this model, competition has an ambiguous effect on innovation. On the one hand, it discourages laggard firms from innovating, as it reduces their rents from catching up with the leaders in the same industry. On the other hand, it encourages neck-and-neck firms to innovate in order to escape competition with their rival. The inverted-U pattern results from the interplay between these two effects, together with the effect of competition on the equilibrium industry structure. The model generates two additional predictions: on the relationship between competition and the average technological distance between leaders and followers across industries; and on the relationship between the distance of an industry to its technological frontier and the steepness of the inverted-U. Both predictions are supported by the data.

Suggested Citation

Aghion, Philippe and Bloom, Nicholas and Blundell, Richard W. and Griffith, Rachel and Howitt, Peter, Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship (June 7, 2004). Advanced Institute of Management Research Paper No. 007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1306944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1306944

Philippe Aghion (Contact Author)

College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nicholas Bloom

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building, Room 231
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-7836 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://economics.stanford.edu/faculty/bloom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Richard W. Blundell

UCL ( email )

Department of Economics
Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
+44 20 7504 5863 (Phone)
+44 20 7916 2773 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctp39a/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Rachel Griffith

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) ( email )

7 Ridgmount Street
London WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7291 4800 (Phone)
+44 20 7323 4780 (Fax)

University of Manchester ( email )

Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifs.org.uk/people/profile?id=37

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Peter Howitt

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2145 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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