Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 9854
27 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2009
Date Written: May 1, 1998
Abstract
This paper starts with a discussion of the various aspects of accountability of central banks. On the basis of this discussion we construct an indicator for accountability for 16 central banks, including the European Central Bank. It is shown that the degree of accountability differs considerably and that the ECB has a rather low score. The indicator is used to examine the relationship between central bank independence and accountability. It is concluded that although there appears to be a negative relationship between independence and accountability, this certainly does not imply that a central bank cannot be both independent and accountable.
Keywords: Central banks, democratic accountability, independence, indicators, comparison, European Central Bank
JEL Classification: K10, K29, L51, E52, E58
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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