Econometric Evidence on the Impacts of Privatization, New Entry, and Independent Industry Regulator on Mobile Network Penetration and Expansion

ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-35

29 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2008

See all articles by Yan Li

Yan Li

ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia

Date Written: December 15, 2008

Abstract

This study examines the impacts of reforms - privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority - on mobile network penetration and expansion using a new and hitherto unused panel dataset for 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and China) over the time period 1991-2006 under a 3-equation econometric framework. The estimation results confirm that introducing new entry is, in general, positively correlated with mobile network penetration and expansion; and in particular, the third entry brings many more benefits than the second one. The results also highlight the crucial role of an independent regulator in privatized mobile markets. Especially, the dynamic estimation results suggest that without an independent regulator, privatization is, on average, negatively correlated with mobile network expansion, even in certain competitive market environments.

Keywords: New entry, privatization, independent regulator, mobile network, econometric analysis

JEL Classification: L10, L51, L96, K23

Suggested Citation

Li, Yan, Econometric Evidence on the Impacts of Privatization, New Entry, and Independent Industry Regulator on Mobile Network Penetration and Expansion (December 15, 2008). ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-35, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1316325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1316325

Yan Li (Contact Author)

ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
+44(0)1603597391 (Phone)

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