Upper Houses and the Problem of Elective Dictatorship

RESTRAINING ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP: THE UPPER HOUSE SOLUTION?, Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser, J.R. Nethercote, eds., University of Western Australia Press, 2008

8 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2008

See all articles by Scott Prasser

Scott Prasser

Australian Catholic University

J. R. Nethercote

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Nicholas Aroney

The University of Queensland - T.C. Beirne School of Law; Emory University - Center for the Study of Law and Religion

Abstract

"We live in an elective dictatorship, absolute in theory, if hitherto thought tolerable in practice."

These words were used by Lord Hailsham, a veteran Conservative politician in Britain, to describe the reality of government in his country in 1976. The British Parliament, he added, was controlled by a 'government machine' and debate in it was becoming 'a ritual dance, sometimes interspersed with catcalls'.

Today, Hailsham's words perhaps carry even greater force, not only in Britain but also in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, three other western democracies that adopted the Westminster parliamentary system. If Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders are, like Britons, living under 'elective dictatorships' then how can their elected, single-party 'government machines' be kept in check?

That is the key question examined in this book. Political theorists of the past claimed that the upper houses, or 'houses of review', of bicameral Westminster-style parliaments-Britain's House of Lords, the Australian Senate, the Australian State Legislative Councils-offered a solution because they prevented governments from imposing their will upon their peoples without restraint.

That, at least, was the nineteenth-century theory. But what is the twenty-first-century reality?

This book contains chapters from twenty-one leading international scholars and politicians on the history, the recent performance and the future of upper houses of parliament in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Contributors include:

The Hon. Bill Hayden, AC, Former Governor-General of Australia Professor John Uhr, Australian National University Professor Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University Dr. Meg Russell, Constitution Unit, University College London Mr. Harry Evans, Clerk of the Australian Senate Senator George Brandis, SC Senator John Hogg Professor Paul G. Thomas, University of Manitoba Professor David C. Docherty, Wilfrid Laurier University Mr. Graeme Starr Dr. Bruce Stone, University of Western Australia Professor Brian Costar, Swinburne University Dr. Clement Macintyre, University of Adelaide Professor John Williams, University of Adelaide Hon. Justice B.H. McPherson, CBE, Former Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Qld Dr. Janet Ransley, Griffith University Professor Gerard Carney, Bond University Emeritus Professor Colin A. Hughes, University of Queensland

Keywords: upper houses, second chambers, elective dictatorship, government accountability, democracy

JEL Classification: H11

Suggested Citation

Prasser, Scott and Nethercote, J. R. and Aroney, Nicholas, Upper Houses and the Problem of Elective Dictatorship. RESTRAINING ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP: THE UPPER HOUSE SOLUTION?, Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser, J.R. Nethercote, eds., University of Western Australia Press, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1316770

Scott Prasser

Australian Catholic University ( email )

PO Box 256 Dickson
Canberra, ACT 2602
Australia
02 6209 1248 (Phone)

J. R. Nethercote

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Nicholas Aroney (Contact Author)

The University of Queensland - T.C. Beirne School of Law ( email )

Brisbane 4072, Queensland
Australia
+61-(0)7-3365 3053 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.uq.edu.au/profile/1098/nicholas-aroney

Emory University - Center for the Study of Law and Religion ( email )

Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cslr.law.emory.edu/people/senior-fellows/aroney-nicholas.html

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