Consumer Boycotts v. Civil Litigation: A Rudimentary Efficiency Analysis

29 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2008

See all articles by Andre L. Smith

Andre L. Smith

Economic Justice Law Review; Howard University School of Law

Date Written: December, 18 2008

Abstract

Facial legal equality has not quelled the importance of achieving overall equality, especially economic equality. Consider that blacks as a whole have made little, if any, economic progress from the pre-civil rights movement era to the present. Activists for racial equality must continue to employ methods geared towards achieving equality in the areas of economics and resources. However, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the idea of equality via outcomes. Moreover, the costs associated with traditional litigation strategies continue to rise, while availability of effective remedies falls. The solution to this quandary may lie in a traditional, privately engaged, civil rights tested, internationally recognized protest tactic: the consumer boycott.

Boycotts have been successfully employed in a variety of circumstances, in differing eras, and in all parts of the world. They are particularly beneficial to a capitalist market because they expedite the elimination of inefficient racial discrimination in the marketplace. As a means for blacks to address economic inequality, anyone interested in fighting for justice can participate at no or a relatively low cost, and the demands of the boycott can garner tangible remedies from unlawful discriminators. To further facilitate the advantages of consumer boycotts, an organization (newly created or an arm of an existing civil rights organization) should be established and dedicated to the specific task of effecting economic justice using the market power of black consumers.

Keywords: civil rights, economics, efficiency, boycotts, protest

Suggested Citation

Smith, Andre L., Consumer Boycotts v. Civil Litigation: A Rudimentary Efficiency Analysis (December, 18 2008). Howard Law Journal, Vol. 43, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1317884

Andre L. Smith (Contact Author)

Economic Justice Law Review ( email )

United States

Howard University School of Law ( email )

2900 Van Ness Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
939
Rank
571,914
PlumX Metrics