Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Performance

39 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2009 Last revised: 8 Oct 2013

See all articles by Iain M. Cockburn

Iain M. Cockburn

Boston University Questrom School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Megan MacGarvie

Boston University School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Elisabeth Mueller

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We examine the relationship between fragmented intellectual property (IP) rights and innovative performance, taking into consideration the role played by in-licensing of IP. Controlling for a variety of firm and market characteristics, we find that firms facing more fragmented IP landscapes are more likely to report expenditures on in-licensing and for those firms that do incur license costs we find a weak positive association between licensing expenditure and fragmented IP rights in the relevant technology. We also observe a negative relationship between IP fragmentation and innovative performance, but only for firms that engage in in-licensing and only for product innovation. The relationship between fragmentation and innovative performance also depends on the size of a firm's patent portfolio, which suggests an important strategic role for defensive patenting in the context of fragmented property rights.

Keywords: patent thickets, licensing, innovative performance

JEL Classification: O34, O31

Suggested Citation

Cockburn, Iain M. and MacGarvie, Megan and Mueller, Elisabeth, Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Performance (2008). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 08-101, Boston U. School of Management Research Paper No. 2009-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1328844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1328844

Iain M. Cockburn (Contact Author)

Boston University Questrom School of Business ( email )

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Boston, MA MA 02215
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617-353-3775 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Megan MacGarvie

Boston University School of Management ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Elisabeth Mueller

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Defense
Puteaux, Paris 92800
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ieseg.fr/enseignement-et-recherche/enseignant/?id=303434

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