No “Third Way” for Economic Organization? Networks and Quasi-Markets in Broadcasting

Posted: 30 Jan 2009

See all articles by Simon Deakin

Simon Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Ana Lourenco

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Stephen Pratten

University of London, King's College London, Department of Management

Date Written: February 2009

Abstract

We present two linked, longitudinal case studies of the use of quasi-markets in United Kingdom broadcasting over the past decade: one looks at the regulated outsourcing of programme making to independent producers, the other at the development of an internal market system within the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). New network forms are shown to have arisen from the interaction of legal regulation, contracts, and property rights. However, these organisational forms are also seen to be associated with increased transaction costs and with signs of deterioration in programme quality and innovation. We suggest that for such networks to be a viable “third way” between markets and hierarchy, closer attention needs to be given to the issue of institutional design.

Suggested Citation

Deakin, Simon F. and Lourenco, Ana and Pratten, Stephen, No “Third Way” for Economic Organization? Networks and Quasi-Markets in Broadcasting (February 2009). Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 18, Issue 1, pp. 51-75, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1335102 or http://dx.doi.org/dtn042

Simon F. Deakin (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

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Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 335243 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Ana Lourenco

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Stephen Pratten

University of London, King's College London, Department of Management ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NN
United Kingdom
020 7848 4201 (Phone)
020 7848 4201 (Fax)

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