Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
66 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2009 Last revised: 8 May 2011
Date Written: April 21, 2011
Abstract
Using a dataset of 28,635 firms in 45 countries, this study investigates the motivations for family-controlled business groups. We provide new evidence consistent with the argument that particular group structures emerge not only to perpetuate control, but also to alleviate financing constraints at the country and firm levels. At the country level, family groups, especially those structured as pyramids, are more prevalent in markets with limited availability of capital. At the firm level, investment intensity is greater for firms held in pyramidal rather than in horizontal structures, reflecting the financing advantages of the former. Within a pyramid, internal equity funding, investment intensity and firm value all increase down the ownership chain. However, group firm performance declines when dual-class shares and cross shareholdings are used as additional control-enhancing mechanisms.
Keywords: Business Groups, Firm Value, Ownership Structure, Family Firms
JEL Classification: G32, G34, D21, D23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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