Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK
55 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 1998
There are 2 versions of this paper
Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK
Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK
Date Written: October 6, 1998
Abstract
To the opposite of most Continental European countries, the UK has had stringent rules on ownership disclosure for more than 50 years. However, despite this, we show that the corporate governance system in the UK still needs be improved. The way ownership of listed companies is concentrated in the hands of corporate directors and of passive institutional investors creates its own type of agency problems, i.e. high managerial discretion. Furthermore, there is mounting evidence that hostile takeovers do not necessarily discipline badly performing managers.
JEL Classification: G32, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
A Survey of Corporate Governance
By Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny
-
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations
By Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, ...
-
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control
By Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver Hart