Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
75 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2009
Date Written: June 11, 2009
Abstract
A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender is if his reputational concerns are low; but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased.
Keywords: strategic communication through intermediaries, agenda-pushing, media bias, reputational concerns
JEL Classification: C70, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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