Sophisticated Monetary Policies

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 419

Posted: 30 Jun 2009

See all articles by Andrew Atkeson

Andrew Atkeson

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Varadarajan V. Chari

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Patrick J. Kehoe

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Research Department; University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 30, 2008

Abstract

In standard approaches to monetary policy, interest rate rules often lead to indeterminacy. Sophisticated policies, which depend on the history of private actions and can differ on and off the equilibrium path, can eliminate indeterminacy and uniquely implement any desired competitive equilibrium. Two types of sophisticated policies illustrate our approach. Both use interest rates as the policy instrument along the equilibrium path. But when agents deviate from that path, the regime switches, in one example to money; in the other, to a hybrid rule. Both lead to unique implementation, while pure interest rate rules do not. We argue that adherence to the Taylor principle is neither necessary nor sufficient for unique implementation with pure interest rate rules but is sufficient with hybrid rules. Our results are robust to imperfect information and may provide a rationale for empirical work on monetary policy rules and determinacy.

Keywords: Taylor rule; Implementation; New Keynsian model; King rule

JEL Classification: E5, E6

Suggested Citation

Atkeson, Andrew G. and Chari, Varadarajan V. and Kehoe, Patrick J., Sophisticated Monetary Policies (December 30, 2008). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 419, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1424128

Andrew G. Atkeson

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 951477
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Varadarajan V. Chari

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Patrick J. Kehoe (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis - Research Department ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States
612-204-5525 (Phone)
612-204-5515 (Fax)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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