Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality

41 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2009 Last revised: 23 Dec 2012

See all articles by Anthony Creane

Anthony Creane

University of Kentucky

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 19, 2012

Abstract

In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider a market in which sellers make observable investment decisions to enter a market in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry has the tendency to lower prices, which may lead to adverse selection. The implied price collapse limits the amount of entry so that high prices are sustained in equilibrium, which results in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about product quality may instead be characterized by above normal profits even in markets with low measures of concentration and less entry than would be expected.

Keywords: adverse selection, asymmetric information, entry, entry barriers, investment

JEL Classification: D8

Suggested Citation

Creane, Anthony and Jeitschko, Thomas D., Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality (September 19, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1427930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427930

Anthony Creane

University of Kentucky ( email )

Lexington, KY 40506
United States

Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/

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