Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-069/1

31 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2009

See all articles by Josse Delfgaauw

Josse Delfgaauw

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Joeri Sol

University of Amsterdam

Willem Verbeke

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 4, 2009

Abstract

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding.

Keywords: field experiment, gender differences, competition, sales contests, awards

JEL Classification: C93, J16, M52

Suggested Citation

Delfgaauw, Josse and Dur, Robert and Sol, Joeri and Verbeke, Willem, Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace (August 4, 2009). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-069/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1443823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443823

Josse Delfgaauw (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Joeri Sol

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands

Willem Verbeke

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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