Betrayal Aversion is Reasonable

Behav.& Brain Science, Vol. 28, No. 556, 2005

2 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

This article was written in response to Cass Sunstein’s, Moral Heuristics. We accept Sunstein’s claim that people often use moral heuristics to make judgments and decisions. Indeed, given people’s desire for social goals such as fairness, justice, and trustworthiness, it would be strange if moral intuitions did not impact the decisions people make. However, it is less clear that these moral intuitions - or moral heuristics - are as prone to systematic error as the classic heuristics in situations that include a risk of betrayal. We disagree with Sunstein about when the relevant moral heuristic may be said to “misfire”. We suggest that the moral heuristic people apply to avoid the possibility of safety-product betrayal may be reasonable.

Keywords: Moral heuristics, decision making, betrayal

Suggested Citation

Koehler, Jonathan J. and Gershoff, Andrew, Betrayal Aversion is Reasonable (2005). Behav.& Brain Science, Vol. 28, No. 556, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469677

Jonathan J. Koehler (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Andrew Gershoff

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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