Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis

46 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2009 Last revised: 15 Jan 2010

See all articles by Paul F. Kirgis

Paul F. Kirgis

St. John's University School of Law; University of Montana - Alexander Blewett III School of Law

Date Written: September 29, 2009

Abstract

As arbitration agreements become more common, bankruptcy courts increasingly encounter arbitration agreements to which a bankruptcy debtor is a party. Bankruptcy judges must then determine whether to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration clause or to refuse enforcement and decide the underlying dispute themselves. To date, bankruptcy judges facing these issues have tended to see arbitration as a competing, quasi-judicial forum. They typically refuse to enforce arbitration agreements when they find that bankruptcy policy would favor resolution in the bankruptcy proceeding instead of in some other adjudicative forum. Building on previous work, I contend in this article that arbitration is best understood not as a type of quasi-adjudication, but as a species of contract, with the award equivalent to a contract term agreed upon by the parties ex ante. I argue that arbitration agreements should be enforced by bankruptcy courts unless enforcement would prevent a party from vindicating its statutory bankruptcy rights, and that bankruptcy courts should then decide whether to enforce the award by considering whether the award would contravene the policy of bankruptcy law if it had been a contract term.

Keywords: arbitration, bankruptcy, contract, judicial review, public policy

Suggested Citation

Kirgis, Paul F., Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis (September 29, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1480301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1480301

Paul F. Kirgis (Contact Author)

St. John's University School of Law ( email )

8000 Utopia Parkway
Jamaica, NY 11439
United States

University of Montana - Alexander Blewett III School of Law ( email )

Missoula, MT 59812-0002
United States

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