Evolutionary Stability of Prospect Theory Preferences
21 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2009
Date Written: October 1, 2009
Abstract
We demonstrate that in simple 2x2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players with prospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. This holds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of mixed strategies. We also show that in a typical game with infinitely many strategies, the “war of attrition”, probability weighting is evolutionarily stable. Finally, we generalize to other notions of stability. Our results may help to explain why probability weighting is generally observed in humans, although it is not optimal in usual decision problems.
Keywords: prospect theory, existence of Nash equilibria, evolutionary stability
JEL Classification: C70, C73, D81
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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