A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle

26 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2009

See all articles by Niclas Berggren

Niclas Berggren

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

The generality principle advocated by Buchanan and Congleton (1998), stating that only legislation which treats all citizens equally as citizens is permissible, is normally motivated on contractarian grounds. It is shown that the generality principle can also be motivated on preference-utilitarian grounds. This is in line with Hayek (1960), who defends the rule of law by reference to consequentialist considerations. Using Hare’s (1981) terminology, on a critical level we realize that everyday political decisionmaking tends to generate rash and non-general outcomes and that a rule limiting the action space of politicians can induce a higher degree of total preference satisfaction.

Keywords: utilitarian, generality, institutions, contractarian

JEL Classification: D72, D79

Suggested Citation

Berggren, Niclas, A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle (1999). Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1491537

Niclas Berggren (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/nb

University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration ( email )

nám. W. Churchilla 4
Praha, 130 67
Czech Republic

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