Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium
14 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2009
Date Written: October 12, 2009
Abstract
This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε ∈ [0,1).
Keywords: implementation, minimax regret, Maskin monotonicity
JEL Classification: C72, D71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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