The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis

Transatlantic Public Policy Series, Vol. 5, 2010

Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 09-54

34 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2009 Last revised: 22 Dec 2009

See all articles by Alasdair S. Roberts

Alasdair S. Roberts

University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy

Date Written: December 16, 2009

Abstract

There was a "quiet revolution" in central banking during the era of liberalization, which led to the delegation of power to a class of technocrat-guardians who were carefully buffered from direct political control. The credibility of this new central banking regime has been damaged by its failure to anticipate the financial crisis and the quickness with which the technocrats' views about the appropriate role of central banks was abandoned during the crisis itself. Central banking is only one of several areas in which the financial crisis has raised doubts about reforms that empowered technocrats and imposed disciplines on democratic institutions.

Keywords: central banks, democracy, financial crisis, public service reform

Suggested Citation

Roberts, Alasdair S., The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis (December 16, 2009). Transatlantic Public Policy Series, Vol. 5, 2010, Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 09-54, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1524266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524266

Alasdair S. Roberts (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy ( email )

Thompson Hall
Amherst, MA 01003
United States
6175999029 (Phone)

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