Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers

Posted: 22 Dec 2009

See all articles by Kai Hüschelrath

Kai Hüschelrath

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

This paper discusses possibilities to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In particular, it develops a detection framework for antitrust authorities. The framework considers the potential welfare effects of mergers through changes in product prices and efficiencies, as well as product variety, marketing, and innovation incentives. The implementation of the framework is addressed through the derivation of back-of-the-envelope formulas.

Keywords: L40, L41, K21

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai, Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers (December 2009). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 683-721, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1525313 or http://dx.doi.org/nhp008

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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