Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers
Posted: 22 Dec 2009
Date Written: December 2009
Abstract
This paper discusses possibilities to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In particular, it develops a detection framework for antitrust authorities. The framework considers the potential welfare effects of mergers through changes in product prices and efficiencies, as well as product variety, marketing, and innovation incentives. The implementation of the framework is addressed through the derivation of back-of-the-envelope formulas.
Keywords: L40, L41, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hüschelrath, Kai, Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers (December 2009). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 683-721, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1525313 or http://dx.doi.org/nhp008
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