Where Agencies, the Courts, and the Legislature Collide: Ten Years of Interpreting the Texas Constitutional Provisions for Home Equity Lending
Texas Tech Administrative Law Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 69-113, 2007
45 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2010
Date Written: November 5, 2007
Abstract
The administrative law saga of how home equity loans came to Texas and how the rules that govern them have been embedded in the Texas Constitution, interpreted by the Finance Commission of Texas and the Credit Union Commission of Texas (the Commissions), challenged in court, rewritten by the Commissions, bounced back to the Texas legislature, and most recently sent to the Texas voters again on November 6, 2007, would make a spellbinding soap opera. The substantive and procedural drama includes lobbying and lawsuits, triumphs and turmoil.
This Article explores what has happened with home equity law and regulations over the past ten years. A recurring theme has been, and remains, the legal tension between the practical necessity for administrative guidance and the vulnerability of agency interpretations to judicial challenges. After examining the development of constitutional home equity authorization and restrictions, this Article highlights current unresolved issues in home equity lending. Finally, the Article considers the Texas home equity borrower protections in light of the subprime mortgage problems and high foreclosure rates dominating today’s financial news.
Keywords: Administrative Law, Home Equity Loans, Home Equity Law, Consumer Protection
JEL Classification: K23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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