Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited

34 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2010

See all articles by Robert S. Gibbons

Robert S. Gibbons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard Holden

University of Chicago

Michael L. Powell

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 22, 2010

Abstract

We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can own. As in property rights models, different ownership structures create different incentives for the parties' investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal ownership structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the ownership choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogeneous dyads to choose heterogeneous ownership structures.

JEL Classification: D20, D23

Suggested Citation

Gibbons, Robert S. and Holden, Richard and Powell, Michael L., Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited (January 22, 2010). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4776-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1574468 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574468

Robert S. Gibbons (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics ( email )

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Richard Holden

University of Chicago ( email )

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Michael L. Powell

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

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