More Competition-Oriented Public Procurement to Foster Social Welfare

TOWARDS NEW HORIZONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, KV Thai, ed., Boca Raton, FL, PrAcademics Press, 2010

30 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2010 Last revised: 31 Aug 2010

Date Written: March 22, 2010

Abstract

Competition is the best means to ensure efficient allocation of resources. Hence, the achievement of value for money depends crucially on the development of public procurement activities in highly competitive markets. However, public procurement can generate significant (negative) effects on market competition dynamics - which, in a significant number of instances, result in a loss of efficiency and, ultimately, of social welfare. Therefore, competition-restrictive public procurement is self-defeating. However, most publicly-generated competition restrictions are avoidable - particularly through the establishment and full-enforcement of a competition principle.

Based on the regulatory situation in the European Union, this paper focuses on the relevance of placing a competition principle amongst the basic foundations and goals of public procurement (together with transparency and efficiency), and offers general criteria for the development of a competition-oriented public procurement system that furthers social welfare by means of increased value for money.

Keywords: public procurement, public buyer, restraints and distortions of competition, competition principle, functional approach

JEL Classification: K21, K23, K42

Suggested Citation

Sanchez-Graells, Albert, More Competition-Oriented Public Procurement to Foster Social Welfare (March 22, 2010). TOWARDS NEW HORIZONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, KV Thai, ed., Boca Raton, FL, PrAcademics Press, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1576698

Albert Sanchez-Graells (Contact Author)

University of Bristol Law School ( email )

Law School Wills Memorial Building Queen's Road Br
Bristol, BS8 1RJ
United Kingdom

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