Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence

(2008) 33 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1-25

25 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2010 Last revised: 7 Jul 2020

Date Written: December 1, 2008

Abstract

Kant’s political philosophy draws a distinction between ‘passive’ citizens who are merely protected by the law and ‘active’ citizens who may also contribute to it. Although the distinction between passive and active citizens is often dismissed by scholars as an ‘illiberal and undemocratic’ relic of eighteenth century prejudice, the distinction is found in every democracy that distinguishes between mere inhabitants - such as tourists and guest workers - and enfranchised citizens. The purpose of this essay is both interpretive and suggestive. First, I will argue that Kant’s mature distinction between active and passive citizens follows from an institutional deficiency in the developing state rather than the natural deficiency of passive citizens, as Kant’s critics have alleged. Second, I will draw on systematic features of Kant’s political thought in order to claim that the state has a duty to create the institutional conditions of universal active citizenship.

Keywords: Kant, citizenship, idea of the original contract

Suggested Citation

Weinrib, Jacob, Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence (December 1, 2008). (2008) 33 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1585400

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
547
Abstract Views
2,265
Rank
93,861
PlumX Metrics