Ambiguity in Election Games

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper No. 364

35 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2000

See all articles by Enriqueta Aragones

Enriqueta Aragones

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Aragonés, Enriqueta and Postlewaite, Andrew, Ambiguity in Election Games. Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper No. 364, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=159236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159236

Enriqueta Aragonés (Contact Author)

Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis ( email )

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Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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