Interdependencies in IT Infrastructure Services: Analyzing Service Processes for Optimal Incentive Design

39 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2010

See all articles by Sagnika Sen

Sagnika Sen

Pennsylvania State University

T. S. Raghu

Arizona State University - W. P. Carey School of Business

Date Written: April 12, 2010

Abstract

IT infrastructure outsourcing arrangements involve multiple services and processes. Supporting a service often impact the efficiency, effectiveness and performance of other related services. Such interdependencies pose significant challenges in designing appropriate incentives to influence provider’s effort allocation decisions. By integrating process modeling fundamentals with multi-task agency theory, we enumerate the base set of possible interrelationships among different IT service processes, and derive corresponding optimal incentives. Our results demonstrate the impacts of risk profile, random noise, value-cost ratio, and process structure on optimal incentive rates. We find that the current practice of treating IT services as essentially independent is optimal only in limited settings where service provider and customer are risk neutral. Interestingly, non-congruent performance measurement requires optimal incentive rates to respond in complex ways to the strength of coupling between services, and the complementarity and substitutability of services. We also analyze more complex process scenarios using different combinations of the base set. The results demonstrate that while the findings from the base set largely hold, value-cost ratio of the services can pose unique challenges in determining incentive rates.

Keywords: IT Outsourcing, Service Level Agreements, Incentives, Agency Theory, Process Interdependence

JEL Classification: M21, O31

Suggested Citation

Sen, Sagnika and Raghu, T. S., Interdependencies in IT Infrastructure Services: Analyzing Service Processes for Optimal Incentive Design (April 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1597371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1597371

Sagnika Sen (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

School of Graduate Professional Studies
30 East Swedesford Road
Malvern, PA 19355
United States
610-725-5361 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sgps.psu.edu/FacultyProfile.aspx?id=3298

T. S. Raghu

Arizona State University - W. P. Carey School of Business ( email )

Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://wpcarey.asu.edu/people/profile/192381

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