Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks
The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2009
20 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010 Last revised: 3 Jul 2010
Date Written: October 31, 2008
Abstract
In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.
Keywords: peer-to-peer networks, file sharing incentive schemes, mechanism design
JEL Classification: D82, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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