Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2009

20 Pages Posted: 19 May 2010 Last revised: 3 Jul 2010

See all articles by Oksana Loginova

Oksana Loginova

University of Missouri

Xinghe Henry Wang

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics

Haibin Lu

Univerity of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Computer Science

Date Written: October 31, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Keywords: peer-to-peer networks, file sharing incentive schemes, mechanism design

JEL Classification: D82, C72

Suggested Citation

Loginova, Oksana and Wang, Xinghe Henry and Lu, Haibin, Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks (October 31, 2008). The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1611858

Oksana Loginova (Contact Author)

University of Missouri ( email )

118 Professional Building
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
1-573-882-0063 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://web.missouri.edu/~loginovao/

Xinghe Henry Wang

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Economics ( email )

118 Professional Building
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-4954 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.missouri.edu/~econwang/

Haibin Lu

Univerity of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Computer Science ( email )

332 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO Columbia 65211
United States

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